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Online vendors use personal information to deliver customized services efficiently to their customers. Both users and vendors 
value the relationship building made possible using personal data. However, the use of personally identifying data gives rise 
to the potential for privacy invasion. When consumers must disclose personal information, they are forced to perform a risk-
benefit analysis in which the risks of disclosing one's personal information are weighted against the potential benefits of the 
disclosure. While some researchers note that consumers maximize benefits in deciding whether to disclose personal 
information, others argue that consumers lack sufficient information and power to make educated, balanced decisions 
regarding disclosing their private information. We add to the privacy discussion by arguing that a real negotiation position for 
both parties can help realize the full benefits of online personalization. We propose a model for mitigating the tension 
between the benefits of personalization and the risks to privacy invasion. This framework informs our future work which 
seeks to develop rich and deep understandings of negotiated, privacy-concerned personalization.  
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1BINTRODUCTION 
E-commerce has made it possible for vendors to provide personalized, online services to their valued customers. Not 
only does the Web enable a virtual replication of the old fashion, customized market where every customer who walked 
through the door of the brick and mortar market was recognized by the vendor, but it also promises a more effective form of 
personalization. For the customer the benefits of customization include: convenience of reduced transaction time for future 
transactions, financial reward offers, and discount offers. For the vendor personalization provides benefits such as: repeat 
customers, customer loyalty, and cross-selling (Chellappa and Sin, 2005). This level of personalization is not restricted to 
only a few industries or specialized web sites. Web sites ranging from those supporting financial services organizations (e.g., 
CapitalOne) to social networks and blogs can be enhanced to provide personalized services; Wind (2001) suggests that 
companies risk losing to the competition if they fail to provide such services.  
Both users and vendors value the benefits that gathering personal data engenders. However, the use of personally 
identifying information by vendors gives rise to the potential for privacy invasion. The current privacy literature suggests that  
there is a tension between the benefits of personalization and the risks associated with privacy invasion (Metzger, 2007). 
When consumers  make an information disclosure decision, they may perform a risk-benefit analysis in which the potential 
risks of disclosing one's personal information are weighted against the potential benefits of disclosure (Hui, Teo and Lee, 
2007; Kobsa, 2007; Metzger, 2007). While some researchers claim that consumers maximize the benefits when deciding 
whether to disclose private information (Hui et al., 2007; Metzger, 2007), others assert that consumers  lack sufficient 
information to make informed  decisions regarding information privacy (Kobsa, 2007).   
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E-commerce transactions that exchange a product or service (the first exchange) whose attributes are pre-specified, as 
well as personal information (the second exchange) appropriately bargain on the price of the product or service however, 
there is little or no bargaining on the second exchange. Customers are usually required to provide personal information in 
order to complete the transaction. This creates an asymmetric distribution of power (Dwyer and Walker, 1981) in favor of the 
vendor with respect to second exchanges. Where privacy invasion is a concern, consumer negotiating options are limited to 
providing erroneous personal information or abandoning the transaction and possibly seek out alternative (substitute) product 
or services from a competitor (i.e. a vendor with lesser disclosure requirements). In such situations, neither the vendor nor the 
consumer enjoys the benefits of online relationship building that the exchange of personal data proffers. To resolve this 
imbalance, we posit that a real negotiation position for both parties can help realize the full benefits of online personalization 
for e-commerce transactions.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related privacy studies and negotiation in the next section. 
Next, we discuss the role of negotiation in privacy-enhanced, e-commerce transactions. We then present a framework that 
informs our future work in negotiated second exchanges for e-commerce transactions. We then conclude the paper. 
2BRELATED STUDIES 
7BPrivacy 
Smith, Milberg, and Burke (1996) developed an information privacy instrument which was empirically validated by 
Stewart and Segars (2002). The instrument which measures individuals’ concerns for organizational information privacy 
practices consists of four dimensions: collection, errors, unauthorized secondary use, and improper access. 
Current privacy literature recognizes the conflict that arises between the potential benefits of personalization to the 
user/consumer and the risk of privacy invasion resulting from divulging that personal information in e-commerce transactions 
(Metzger, 2007). Kobsa (2007, p26) calls this conflict “the privacy calculus.” Kobsa observes that users lack sufficient 
information to be able to make educated, privacy-related decisions asserting that users often underestimate the probability of 
being identified if they disclose certain data, and that they are unfamiliar with privacy practices since privacy statements can 
be difficult to understand. Hui, Teo and Lee  (2007) use contemporary choice theory to explain the discord between privacy 
and personalization. Contemporary choice theory assumes that people make choices by maximizing a multiattribute utility 
function (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1986). These attributes may be economic (e.g., money, 
time) or psychological (e.g., pleasure, risks) and can be compensatory such that  the utility of a desirable attribute may be 
offset by the disutility of an undesirable attribute (Hui et al., 2007, p.21). Recently, a second theory, the communication 
privacy management theory (CPM), has been employed to explain the tradeoffs between privacy and information disclosure 
(Metzger 2007).  CPM, a rule-based theory, posits that the best way to protect personal privacy is by developing rules to 
assist decision makers about whether to reveal or conceal private information.  
A number of studies have identified several variables that influence consumers’ intention to disclose and the actual 
disclosure of private information. These variables include: personality; culture-based privacy attitudes; type of information to 
be disclosed and its deviance from the average; the credibility of the recipient; the consumer’s perception of the value of 
personalization and monetary incentives; as well as the extent to which users know what information has been disclosed, and 
the extent to which to which they can control its usage (e.g., Hann, Hui, Lee and Png, 2002; Kobsa, 2007; Milne and Gordon, 
1993). Surveys show that generally users feel different about the disclosure of various types of information. The presence or 
absence of trust in a vendor’s Website affects people's motivations to disclose personal information (Hui et al., 2007), and 
antecedents to this trust have been shown to include: a positive past experience, the design and operation of website, the 
reputation of website operator, the presence of a privacy statement, and the presence of a privacy seal (Kobsa, 2007).  
8BNegotiation 
Negotiation is defined as an iterative communication and decision making process between two or more parties who 
exchange information comprising offers, counter-offers and arguments; deal with interdependent tasks; and search for a 
consensus or compromise decision (Bichler, Kersten and Strecker, 2003). The outcome of a negotiation is therefore a 
compromise (i.e. an agreement) or an impasse (a failure to reach agreement) (Bichler et al., 2003). In either case, negotiations 
follow rules which are explicitly specified. The term negotiation is sometimes used synonymously with bilateral bargaining 
in contrast to auctions (Bulow and Kelemperer, 1995); this is particularly so in the game-auction-theoretic streams of 
economic research. In e-commerce research, this has resulted in a view of negotiations that is predominated by the auction 
approach that sees every structured message exchange as an auction (Wurman, Wellman and Walsh, 2001).  
Kunene et al.  Negotiation in  privacy-enhanced e-commerce transactions  
Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information Systems Conference, Richmond, VA, USA March 13th-15th, 2008 3 
While traditional auctions are resource allocation mechanisms centered on a competitive bidding over a single issue (i.e. 
price) for a single, well-defined object and involve a “set of auction rules that specify how the winner is determined and how 
much he has to pay” (Wolfsetter, 1996), negotiations are often much more complex. These “traditional” negotiations are 
based on bilateral/multi-lateral/ multi-bilateral processes over a single or multiple issues of one or more well/partially/ill-
defined objects, and involve cooperation and/or competition among the negotiating agents. The processes focus on the 
underlying objectives instead of price as an indicator of preference. Bilateral bargaining involves two parties who compete or 
cooperate in order to achieve a compromise (Bichler et al., 2003).   
With e-negotiations (i.e. negotiations that take place via electronic media), four formal approaches have been used: 
decision theory, game theory, negotiation analysis and auction theory. These approaches provide a basis for e-negotiation 
protocols and their media (Bichler et al., 2003). These theories focus on several different perspectives, including the 
relationship between the individual and social characteristics of the negotiation process and its outcomes, communication 
patterns, cognitive biases, interpretations and misinterpretations, and the relationships between individual characteristics and 
the process (Bichler, 2001).  
3BTHE ROLE OF NEGOTIATION IN E-COMMERCE TRANSACTIONS 
Although both users and vendors value the benefits of personalization in e-commerce (Kobsa, 2007), the collection and 
use of personally identifying information by vendors puts users at risk of privacy invasion. Invariably when consumers are 
required to disclose personal information they perform a risk-benefit analysis in which the risks of disclosing one's personal 
information are weighted against the potential benefits of the disclosure (Metzger, 2007). However, since e-commerce 
transactions allow for bargaining on the price of the product and not on the second exchange, consumers lack sufficient 
power to make balanced decisions regarding the disclosure of private information (and indeed lack the information to make 
educated decisions). Customers resorting to providing erroneous personal information or abandoning the transaction hinders 
the realization of the benefits of personalization. In this paper we propose that the tension between the realization of the 
benefits of personalization and the risks associated with privacy invasion (Acquisti, 2004; Hann et al., 2002; Kobsa, 2007; 
Metzger, 2007; Westin, 2003) can be moderated by negotiation.  
Of particular interest in this paper is the negotiating position confronted by many consumers in e-commerce where they 
are required to disclose private information in order to acquire a desired product or service (the first exchange).Take the 
general case where product A is sold by one or more vendors that require private information to be disclosed by the consumer 
in order to procure product A; the absence of a real negotiating position distorts the cost-benefit valuation that the consumer 
has to make. The distortion increases in cases where the customer strongly desires the product. In this situation, the consumer 
has little or no negotiating power with respect to disclosing private information (regardless of whether  the potential 
personalization benefits are themselves desirable to the consumer) other than to search for a vendor requiring less private 
information (or deemed less private), falsify the requested information, or go without the product.  In any event, the benefits 
of personalization go unrealized. One potential solution is to negotiate a compromise position suitable to both parties. 
Personalized websites should be designed in a way that enables consumers to negotiate the extent of information disclosure 
given their privacy preferences. An effective design of such systems requires a theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between personalization, privacy and the nature of negotiation. 
Negotiation theories and particularly formal approaches that have been used in e-negotiation i.e. decision theory, game 
theory, auction theory, and negotiation analysis (Bichler, 2001; Bichler et al., 2003) can be used to develop competing 
models of negotiated outcomes in the personalization-privacy invasion dyad. 
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Figure 1 Negotiated Privacy-Enhanced Exchanges 
Figure 1 shows how negotiation can moderate the relationship between personalization and privacy invasion.  We seek to 
examine the relationship between the value of personalization and privacy concerns. We also investigate how negotiation 
moderates the relationship using alternative formal approaches to e-negotiation. Figure 2 depicts the generalized attributes of 
privacy-enhanced exchanges proposed in this paper. The privacy concern construct is operationalized as having four 
dimensions: collection, error, unauthorized secondary use, and improper access (Smith et al., 1996; Stewart and Segars, 
2002).  From the literature, personalization is frequently described by enumerating the various ways in which web sites and 
services are customized for profiling individual users to build ongoing relationships with the user. 
In our model we propose that the personalization variable has the following dimensions: (1) Different types of 
consumers i.e. privacy pragmatists, privacy unconcerned, and privacy fundamentalists (Westin, 2001). (2) The type of 
information collected e.g. anonymous, personally identifying information, personally non-identifiable information (Chellappa 
and Sin, 2005). (3) The nature of the vendor e.g. the perceived trustworthiness, prior experience with the vendor. (4) Types of 
services or products e.g. luxury, financial, informational, medical, entertainment, and community services. (5) Nature of 
benefits (real or perceived) e.g. convenience, cross-selling, customer retainment, discounts and rewards (Chellappa and Sin, 
2005). 
The four different formal approaches to e-negotiation offer different ways of capturing and structuring the privacy-
enhanced exchanges. The differences in the underlying assumptions of each together offer the potential to develop rich and 
deep understandings of negotiated privacy-concerned personalization. For example decision theory and game theory make 
rationality assumptions about the actors, whereas with auctions and negotiation analysis rationality is not a necessary 
component. 
 
PERSONALIZATION NEGOTIATION PRIVACY CONCERNS
Type of consumer Decision theory Collection
Types of information collected Game theory Error
Nature of the Vendor Auction theory
Unauthorized 
Secondary Use
Types of services/products Negotiation analysis Improper Access
Nature of Benefits
 
Figure 2 Attributes of Privacy-Enhanced Exchanges 
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4BCONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we propose a model for mitigating the tension between the benefits of personalization and the risk to privacy 
invasion.  Our model envisages the use of negotiation as a moderator between privacy concerns and personalization. Our 
work adds to the privacy discussion by arguing that a real negotiation position for both vendors and consumers can help 
realize the full benefits of online personalization. We are working to develop this framework further through experimental, 
survey, and field studies. This involves refining and validating the generalized attributes presented in Figure 2. We propose a 
model for mitigating the tension between the benefits of personalization and the risks to privacy invasion. This framework 
informs our future work which seeks to develop rich and deep understandings of negotiated privacy-concerned 
personalization. 
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